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I

In diverse analyses of primary human symbol
ization-Freud in the psychology of dreams,4 Langer
in the aesthetics of art objects, 5 Leroi-Gourhan in the
archaeology of prehistoric artifacts, 6 Foster in the
linguistics of primordiallanguage7~great emphasis is
placed both on the semanticity and on the iconicity of
the symbolizing behavior. The conjoined emphasis,
together with the strongly corporeal character of these
symbolizing behaviors, suggests that semanticity and
iconicity are intimately linked and mutually reinforcing;
and further, that they are, and have been from the
beginning, fundamental rather than adjunctive, or
indeed, missing features of hominid communication.
To show convincingly that this is so requires a critical
examination of how a privileging of human language
is an ahistoricizing of human language that effectively
blots out the fundamentally corporeal nature of
communication in the animate world, and in turn
overlooks the biological pervasiveness of corporeal
representation and the two basic features which defme it.
Many recent theories of animal communication
Dawkins' and Kreb's 8 being the most extreme
example-interpret communicative behavior in terms
of self interest, manipulation, and the like, rather than
in terms of signification or meaning. The same
pragmatic concern generates the not uncommon

The possibility of an evolutionary semantics rests
on at least three interrelated shifts in typical
philosophical practice and belief: a de-privileging of
human language; a recognition of iconic spatio-kinetic
corporeal representation as a fundamental form of
meaning in the animate world; a recognition of modes
ofsymbolization in everyday life that are pre-reflective.
Typical philosophical belief and practice are
exemplified by Jonathan Bennett in his book,
Rationality, 1 wherein human language is taken as the
standard by which the intelligence of bees is measured;
by Daniel Dennett in his intentional systems theory
approach to nonhuman animal behavior which, through
its exclusive focus on cognitive competence in the form
of beliefs, desires, and so on, overlooks corporeal
intentionality and in so doing overlooks the built-in
semanticity of being a body; 2 by Donald Davidson in
his claim that short of language, creatures cannot have
beliefs, desires, and other similar kinds ofpsychological
capacities. 3 This paper will present compelling, if
necessarily abbreviated, evidence for revising typical
philosophical views and adopting an evolutionary
semantics perspective.
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entiates language from mere earlier hominid and other
animal sounds. 13 Correlatively, it is because the
beginning of language is ftxed at the start by definition
that the paradigm prevails. Only humans have language;
therefore language arose (and can only have arisen)
"with their kind." Such exclusive privileging explains
why no data can be adduced which convincingly show
how linguistic behavior arose from nonlinguistic
behavior, for example, how the design feature
discreteness-"the elementary signaling units of a
language [in contrast] with the use of sound effect"14
is functionally or causally connected to what Hockett
identifies as its "related characteristic," namely, "bipedal
locomotion, not upright." 15 In contrast, physio
anatomical changes-for example, changes in the larynx
and tongue (the tongue, it should be noted, is not even
mentioned in Hockett's model), or modifications in the
degree of basicranial flexion-identified by other
evolutionary researchers as essential to the production
of speech, approximate at least to necessary conditions
for the passage from nonspeech to speech and thereby
possess the explanatory power credited to them. 16 The
behavioral motivations proposed by Hockett for the
various design features-e.g., "bipedal locomotion, not
upright"-lack equivalent explanatory power.
This is in fact lingnist Edwin Pulleyblank's criticism
with respect to the all-important design feature, duality
ofpatterning. Precisely how could it have originated?
It is purportedly based on the aibitrariness of linguistic
symbols, yet a plausible explanation of how arbitrary
symbols could possibly have been coined in the frrst
place, that is, how the concept of "meaningless message
elements" arose and anchored duality of patterning, is
not given by Hockett. 17 Indeed, Pulleyblank is rightfully
skeptical of Hockett's "brilliantly successful mutation"
(Hockett's phrase18) to explain how duality ofpatterning
arose. He bas pointed out that what is wanted are not
speculative scenarios of the beginnings of verbal
language but a logical sequence of "what may actually
have happened. "19 He finds this logical sequence by
hypothesizing and demonstrating precisely iconic rather
than arbitrary initial verbal sounds.
The Athena-like paradigm effectively masks further
deficiencies with respect to an evolutionary schema of
hominid communication. The study of root linguistic
forms is neglected, 20 (they are discussed briefly below)
and no rigorously detailed analysis is offered showing
what "language" would actually have been like with
progressively fewer than all of its design features. A

adaptationist explanation of why a verbal language
arose: "It leaves much of the body free for other
activities that can be carried on at the same time. •>9 Cast
in such a perspective, concrete bodily acts productive
at once of both sound and meaning remain unexamined.
But pragmatic favoring also feeds into a privileging of
human language through a depreciation of iconicity
a feature putatively characteristic of nonhuman
communication systems only. The two-step reasoning
upholding the depreciation may be summarized as
follows: l)"The most instructive way to view the
communication systems of animals is to compare these
systems ftrst with human language" 10; 2) the linguistic
elements of human language are arbitrary, not iconic,
and the verbal system itself is characterized by duality
of patterning.l 1 ("Duality of patterning" means that
elementary sound units, meaningless in themselves, are
combined in particular ways, making meaningful units
in each particular language.) E. 0. Wilson, from whose
work I quoted to summarize the ftrst reason, speaks for
the majority when he unequivocally sets human
language as the standard against which all nonhuman
animal communication systems are to be measured and
evaluated. With respect to the second reason, the notion
of arbitrary over iconic elements can be traced back to
Saussure. In recent times, however, it has been
overwhelmingly strengthened by linguist Charles
Hockett's well-known and widely accepted model of
"communication systems," a model which sets forth
"the design features" of language. 12 Brief examination
of this model will show that evolutionary estilnations
of nonhuman animal communication based on the
privileging of human language-and note that the
estimations necessarily include the communication of
nonverbal and inchoately verbal ancestral hominids
are actually based on an ahistorical model: human
language-whenever it is deemed to have arisen-arose
full-blown from the mouths of hominids like the
goddess Athena arose full-blown from the head of Zeus.
An Athena-like paradigm prevails first of all
because those design features of human language
identified by Hockett which are found below the
human stage, that is, in the communication systems
of nonhuman animals as well, do not have any status
as speech (pro forma designations "pre-speech,"
"Proto-speech," "Prelanguage," and the like, to the
contrary). Otherwise stated, it is only the final
confluence of all of the design features under one
cortical roof that constitutes speech and thus differ
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erect posture and erect penis, erect posture being
dynamically congruent with, and reinforcing, penile
display with respect to upward movement, increase in
apparent size, altered and more visibly distinctive shape,
and degree of tautness. Second, in view of the iconic
spatio-kinetic relationship, an early hominid male could
semantically reinforce his display of sexual readiness
and potency by assuming an erect posture. Third,
fundamental species-specific meanings, such as those of
sexual readiness and potency, are mediated through just
such instances of corporeal representation, which is to
say both that where shared meanings are represented,
they are represented by symbolizing the spatio-kinetic
dynamics ofexperience, and that semanticity is a built-in
of being a body. For example, the same kind of iconic
spatio-kinetic corporeal representation and the same kind
of an inherent corporeal semantics are evident in the
display behavior of female howler monkeys in estrus:
"When approaching a male, [the female] will form an
oval opening with her lips and her pro)ruding tongue will
rapidly oscillate in and out and up and down. It is clear
to an observer ... that the function of this gesture is to
invite copulation .... In a real sense the act is symbolic
of sexual desire and readiness for copulation in the
female and it stimulates appropriate responses in the
male." 22 This descriptive report was written by
world-renowned primatologist C. R. Carpenter. The
description implicitly affums the tongue to be a readily
available spatio-kinetic analogue of the penis and the
mouth a readily available spatio-kinetic analogue of the
vagina in the sexual communication ofhowler females.
Tongue and mouth are in fact sexual analogues in the
behavior of other primates as well. 23
Such symbolic behaviors ofnonbumans and humans
alike demonstrate the basically iconic rather than arbitrary
nature of fundamental species behaviors. 24 In general,
animate bodies represent by symbolizing the spatio
kinetic dynamics of their own experiences (or spatio
kinetic reflexive corollaries thereot). In this respect, the
Tanzsprache ("dance speech") of the honeybees is no
different from hominid primordial language, and both
the Tanzsprache and primordial language are no
different from the tongue-flicking sexual display of
female howler monkeys or from the bipedal sexual
display of male early hominids. In each case,
tactile-kinesthetic experience and its spatio-relational
correlates are iconically linked. A brief examination of
the Tanzsprache is especially edifying in demonstrating
these relationships both because its status as a symbolic

step-by-step temporally-reversed model of the origin
and evolution of language by a process of feature
elimination is not given. While theoretically an account
could be given, it would likely run into the kind of
problematic reasonableness identified by Pulleyblank
with respect to duality of patterning. The end result is
that what was and what was not possible to commu
nicate verbally at designated stages of linguistic
sophistication are nowhere spelled out. In broader tenns,
evolutionary-semantic relationships among different
forms of hominid communication-displays, gestures,
vocalizations, rudimentary verbalizations, and finally
speech-are nowhere conceived much less tentatively
hypothesized. A bona fide evolutionary schema of
hominid communication is clearly sacrificed to the
privileging of human language.
II
Iconic spatio-kinetic corporeal representation is an
evolutionarily identifmble biological matrix running all
the way from mimicry through display behavior through
gestural languages through human primordial language.
In what follows, I will omit a discussion of mimicry
and begin with display behavior, specifically early
hominid sexual signaling behavior. [I must raise an
indelicate subject in philosophical circles and will
attempt to do so as painlessly as possible. You know
bow, if you wish to remove a band-aid in the least
painful way, you do it in one fell swoop-well, I am
going to talk about penile display.]
An inverse morphological/visual relationship
obtains between quadrupedal and bipedal primates with
respect to genitalia. Typical primate sexual signaling
behavior centers on the vulva. With the advent of
consistent bipedality, a shift necessarily occurred in
typical primate sexual signaling behavior. Oddly
enough, this shift is nowhere conceived or acknowl
edged by paleoantbropologists. There is insufficient
time here to suggest reasons for this egregious oversight,
save in the present context to say that it is almost as if
with consistent bipedality, hominids are thought
magically to have risen above display behavior. Neither
is there time to spell out the compellingly logical
grounds for assuming that penile display replaced
pudendal presenting. (These grounds are spelled out in
my book, The Roots of 1hinking.)21 The significance
of the shift in the present context is threefold. First,
there is an iconic spatio-kinetic relationship between
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kinetic transcription of worldly experience or activity.
They specify something out in the world apart from the
body yet iconically related to corporeal experience or
activity. This is of course immediately apparent in the
case of the Tanzsprache. But it is also clear in the case
of primordial language. The bilateral relationships
resting against, pressing together, or crushing, for
example, are primordial perceptual meanings anchored
in what might aptly be termed primordial bodily
experiences, that is, in correlative "root" behaviors:
resting against nest materials in sleeping, for example,
or the earth in standing; pressing together in copulating
or in producing the sound m; crushing in chewing food
or pounding one thing with another.
Where the Tanzsprache and primordial language
differ is in both mode of articulation and mode of
communication. In the Tanzsprache articulation is of
the whole body. Mode of communication is likewise a
"whole body gestural .system:" 30 information is
transmitted tactile-kinetically from dancer to potential
recruit In primordial language, as in present-day human
speech, articulation is of the supralaryngeal parts of
the body [tongue, lips, larynx, and so on], 31 and
communication takes place not through intimate
body-to-body contact of articulatory parts, but aurally,
i.e., through a second sensory medium. Communication
in the one instance is thus directly by way of the
tactile-kinetic gestures themselves; in the other by way
of the sounds the gestures create. Thus articulatory
gestures constitute the language in the Tanzsprache; in
primordial language, articulatory gestures are the means
whereby the language is constituted. What is both
interesting and significant in this regard, however, is
that studies of human speech perception show speech
perception to be actually speech apperception. The
listener makes co-present with actual perception
something that is not actually given in the perception:
"the listener responds as though he is interpreting the
acoustic signal in terms of the articulatory gestures that
a speaker would employ to generate the word."32 This
tactile-kinesthetic decoding ofspeech33 is not random
or accidental: "The human brain decodes ... the acoustic
signal in terms of the articulatory maneuvers that were
put together to generate the syllable .... The process of
human speech inherently requires 'knowledge' of the
acoustic consequences of the possible range of human
supralaryngeal vocal tract speech articulation" (italics
added). 34 There is no reason not to assume that in
primordial speech tactile-kinesthetic empathy with the

communicative system was contested and the subject
of investigation for many years,2 5 and because in the
long contentious debate, a basic corporeal dimension
shared not only by human language but by the
above-discussed sexual displays was overlooked.
What was not explicitly recognized is the fact that
information gathered and conveyed by a dancing bee is
rooted in tactile-kinesthetic experience--or its reflexive
(robotic) corollary. Whether a human-like equivalent
of experience is granted to the bee or not is beside the
point. There is a metacorporeal similarity, a body/world
iconicity, between the actual flight of the bee and the
dance by which she represents her flight. This is true
not only with respect to her bodily orientation to the
sun in her actual flight and her correlative orientation
to gravity in her symbolic rendition of the flight, for
example, but with respect to other behaviors which
strikingly point up the role of tactile-kinesthetic
elements even further. For example, if the honeybee's
flight is experimentally made more arduous, the
Tanzsprache reflects the greater effort26; if the sugar
concentration is high-basically a tactile datum-the
vigorousness of the dance is greater. 27 An iconic
relationship clearly exists between tactile-kinesthetically
experienced--or "recorded"-meanings and tactile
kinesthetically represented meanings. The spatio-kinetic
dynamics of actual corporeal activity serve as a semantic
template for the spatio-kinetic representations which
constitute the dance.
Primordial language is similarly rooted in
tactile-kinesthetic experience. Reconstructions of root
forms have demonstrated that articulatory (tactile
kinesthetic) gestures are iconic with respect to their
referents. For example, all root forms with *m refer to
some kind of bilateral relationship-"the fingers or
hands in taking or grasping," for instance, or "two
opposed surfaces in tapering, pressing together, holding
together, crushing, or resting against." 28 The
relationship is in each case isomorphic with the bilateral
articulatory gesture which produces the sound m.
Moreover as the examples suggest, meanings in
primordial language tend to focus on "motional
relational complexes"29 rather than discrete objects, in
the same way that the Tanzsprache represents not an
objectified geographical location, but how far and in
what direction a sugar source is in relation to "home."
Furthermore, representation in primordial language as
well as in the Tanzsprache is metacorporeal. The iconic
articulatory gestures are in each case a spatio-tactile/
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relationships are no longer apparent, corporeal
representation remains a substantive part of language
in the form of metaphor-the brow of a hill, for
example, or counting on someone. Strong support for
this suggestion comes from Lakoff's and Johnson's 38
work which bas demonstrated quite clearly the bodily
origin oforientational and physical metaphors, and from
my own work that complements their thesis in
substantiating the body as a semantic template in the
origin and evolution of fundamental human practices
and beliefs. 39

articulatory gestures of the speaker was similarly
inherently required. From this perspective the ultimate
difference in mode of sensory communication between
the Tanzsprache and primordiaVpresent-day human
language is the difference between actual tactile-kinetic
experience (or "recording") of dance by recruit and
tactile-kinesthetic empathy of listener with speaker. 35
The sexual displays ofa female bowler monkey and
of a male early hominid stand in the same relation to
the tactile-kinesthetic body as primordial and present
day human language stand to the articulatory gestures
of speech, and as the Tanzsprache stands to the
articulatory gestures of the dancer. In each case the
body is iconically representing its own experiences
and is thereby communicating either its bodily
dispositions of the moment, or information about
something in the world. The fact that such experiences
are communicated attests to species-specific
tactile-kinesthetic invariants. Indeed, Hockett's design
feature, interchangeability ("a speaker of a language
can reproduce any linguistic message he can
understand"36), is dependent upon just such invariants,
a fact implicitly apparent in the research on speech
(ap)perception cited above. Short of tactile-kinesthetic
invariants, neither primordial language, present-day
human language, the Tanzsprache, nor sexual displays
would be possible, not in the sense that the performing
individual could not continue speaking, dancing, or
displaying, but that the action would be meaningless
to the individual to whom it was addressed. What is
represented visually, auditorily, or tactile-kinetically
is in each case related to the addressed animal's own
body of prior tactile-kinesthetic experiences (or
activities). This is precisely the concept primatologist
Stuart Altmann tries to capture by his term comsign. 37
The term refers to one of the two prime factors making
primate interchangeability possible; viz., most
primate signals are part of the repertoire of all of the
members of the species (and/or of a particular group
in question), at the very least for some period of time
in the animals' lives. What is true of primates is in
this instance also true of bees. Potential recruits are
potential dancers because tactile-kinesthetic invariants
anchor interchangeability.
There is insufficient time to do more than suggest
that fundamental meanings about oneself and about the
world have in present-day human speech been
incorpomted into language itself as corporeal metaphor.
In other words, though original iconic corporeal
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Whether a matter of primates, apians, or other forms
of animate life, such symbolizing modes as described
above should not be conceived as thoughtfully worked
out patterns of behavior. What Freud said of the
dreamer-that knowledge of the symbolism as such is
unconscious--is also true of the symbolizing animal,
though to be unaware of the symbolism as such does
not mean that the symbolizing animal is unaware of its
behavior. 40 Piaget' s description of the buccal behavior
of an infant is an apt-even strikingly pictorial
confirmation of pre-reflective symbolization.41 The
infant's progressive opening and closing of its mouth
coincident with its focal attempt to open a matchbox is
a pre-reflective gesture symbolic of the dynamics and
anticipated result of its manual activity. The oral gesture
is a spontaneous tactile-kinesthetic symbol, a spatia
kinetic analogue of the behavior: opening a matchbox.
The infant is unaware of the symbolism as such, but
clearly knows corporeally, i.e., in a tactile-kinesthetic
sense, the meanings: open and opening. lbe inherent
epistemological requirements of speech perception
discussed above-the listener must know corporeally
the articulatory gestures of the speaker-is again
corrobomtive of the same fact In equal terms, the sexual
display embodied by the protruding and moving tongue
of a female howler monkey or by the erect posture of a
sexually aroused and motivated male early hominid is
not the result of thought exercises in corporeal
representation or in the semantics and iconicity of
symbols; it is a spontaneous (species-specific) symbolic
behavior rooted in pre-reflective tactile-kinesthetic
corporeal experience.
The evidence presented here shows that the
possibility of an evolutionary semantics is not akin to
the possibility of putting a human on Mars, or to the
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possibility of mapping all possible neurological
happenings in brains. The possibility of an evolutionary
semantics is within immediate grasp, once we climb
down from our pedestals, once we begin fathoming the
bodies we are, once we begin taking evolution seriously.
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